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Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc.,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. Socigti Gin~rale de
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), and Bank ofAmerica, Defendants-Appellees,
Smrri, Circuit Judge:
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., Inc., (Overseas), an American
corporation, appeals from the entry of summary judgment on February 25,
1974, by Judge Lloyd F. MacMahon of the Southern District of New York on
the counterclaim by Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), an
Egyptian corporation, to confirm a foreign arbitral award holding Overseas
liable to RAKTA for breach of contract. RAKTA in turn challenges the court's
concurrent order granting summary judgment on Overseas' complaint, which
sought a declaratory judgment denying RAKTA's entitlement to recover the
amount of a letter of credit issued by Bank of America' in RAKTA's favor at
Overseas' request. Jurisdiction is based on 9 U.S.C. § 203, which empowers
federal district courts to hear cases to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral
awards, and 9 U.S.C. § 205, which authorizes the removal of such cases from
state courts, as was accomplished in this instance.2 We affirm the district
court's confirmation of the foreign award. Since it has been established that
RAKTA can fully satisfy the award out of a supersedeas bond posted by
Overseas, we need not and do not rule on RAKTA's appeal from the
adjudication of its letter of credit claim.
In November, 1962, Overseas consented by written agreement with RAKTA
to construct, start up and, for one year, manage and supervise a paperboard
mill in Alexandria, Egypt. The Agency for International Development (AID), a
branch of the United States State Department, would finance the project by
supplying RAKTA with funds with which to purchase letters of credit in
Overseas' favor. Among the contract's terms was an arbitration clause, which
'Bank of America assumes the position of an innocent stakeholder and awaits this court's
direction on the letter of credit claim.
2Overseas initiated suit in New York Supreme Court and the case was removed to federal court on
RAKTA's petition.
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provided a means to settle differences arising in the course of performance, and
a "force majeure" clause, which excused delay in performance due to causes
beyond Overseas' reasonable capacity to control.
Work proceeded as planned until May, 1967. Then, with the Arab-Israeli Six
Day War on the horizon, recurrent expressions of Egyptian hostility to
Americans-nationals of the principal ally of the Israeli enemy--caused the
majority of the Overseas work crew to leave Egypt. On June 6, the Egyptian
government broke diplomatic ties with the United States and ordered all
Americans expelled from Egypt except those who would apply and qualify for a
special visa.
Having abandoned the project for the present with the construction phase
near completion, Overseas notified RAKTA that it regarded this postponement
as excused by the force majeure clause. RAKTA disagreed and sought damages
for breach of contract. Overseas refused to settle and RAKTA, already at work
on completing the performance promised by Overseas, invoked the arbitration
clause. Overseas responded by calling into play the clause's option to bring a
dispute directly to a three-man arbitral board governed by the rules of the
International Chamber of Commerce. After several sessions in 1970, the
tribunal issued a preliminary award, which recognized Overseas' force majeure
defense as good only during the period from May 28 to June 30, 1967. In so
limiting Overseas' defense, the arbitration court emphasized that Overseas had
made no more than a perfunctory effort to secure special visas and that AID's
notification that it was withdrawing financial backing did not justify Overseas'
unilateral decision to abandon the project.3 After further hearings in 1972, the
tribunal made its final award in March, 1973: Overseas was held liable to
RAKTA for $312,507.45 in damages for breach of contract and $30,000 for
RAKTA's costs; additionally, the arbitrators' compensation was set at $49,000,
with Overseas responsible for three-fourths of the sum.
Subsequent to the final award, Overseas in the action here under review
sought a declaratory judgment to prevent RAKTA from collecting the award
out of a letter of credit issued in RAKTA's favor by Bank of America at
Overseas' request. The letter was drawn to satisfy any "penalties" which an
arbitral tribunal might assess against Overseas in the future for breach of
contract. RAKTA contended that the arbitral award for damages met the
letter's requirement of "penalties" and counter-claimed to confirm and enter
judgment upon the foreign arbitral award. Overseas' defenses to this
counterclaim, all rejected by the district court, form the principal issues for
review on this appeal. Four of these defenses are derived from the express
language of the applicable United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (Convention), 330 U.N. Treaty Ser.
3RAKTA represented to the tribunal that it was prepared to finance the project without AID's
assistance.
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38, and a fifth is arguably implicit in the Convention. These include: enforce-
ment of the award would violate the public policy of the United States; the
award represents an arbitration of matters not appropriately decided by
arbitration; the tribunal denied Overseas an adequate opportunity to present its
case; the award is predicated upon a resolution of issues outside the scope of the
contractual agreement to submit to arbitration; and the award is in manifest
disregard of law. In addition to disputing the district court's rejection of its
position on the letter of credit, RAKTA seeks on appeal modification of the
court's order to correct for an arithmetical error in the sum entered for
judgment, as well as an assessment of damages and double costs against
Overseas for pursuing a frivolous appeal.
I. Overseas' Defenses Against Enforcement
In 1958 the Convention was adopted by 26 of the 45 states participating in the
United Nations Conference on Commercial Arbitration held in New York. For
the signatory states, the New York Convention superseded the Geneva
Convention of 1927, 92 League of Nations Treaty Ser. 302. The 1958
Convention's basic thrust was to liberalize procedures for enforcing foreign
arbitral awards: While the Geneva Convention placed the burden of proof on
the party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and did not
circumscribe the range of available defenses to those enumerated in the
convention, the 1958 Convention clearly shifted the burden of proof to the party
defending against enforcement and limited his defenses to seven set forth in
Article V. See Contini, International Commercial Arbitration, 8 AM. J. COMP.
L. 283, 299 (1959). Not a signatory to any prior multilateral agreement on
enforcement of arbitral awards, the United States declined to sign the 1958
Convention at the outset. The United States ultimately acceded to the
Convention, however, in 1970, [19701 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, and
implemented its accession with 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08. Under 9 U.S.C. § 208, the
existing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, applied to the enforcement
of foreign awards except to the extent to which the latter may conflict with the
Convention. See generally, Comment, International Commercial Arbitration
under the United Nations Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration
Statute, 47 WASH. L. REv. 441 (1972).
A. Public Policy
Article V(2)(b) of the Convention allows the court in which enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award is sought to refuse enforcement, on the defendant's
motion or sua sponte, if "enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of [the forum] country." The legislative history of the provision
offers no certain guidelines to its construction. Its precursors in the Geneva
Convention and the 1958 Convention's ad hoc committee draft extended the
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public policy exception to, respectively, awards contrary to "principles of the
law" and awards violative of "fundamental principles of the law." In one
commentator's view, the Convention's failure to- include similar language
signifies a narrowing of the defense. Contini, supra, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 283 at
304. On the other hand, another noted authority in the field has seized upon
this omission as indicative of an intention to broaden the defense. Quigley,
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049,
1070-71 (1961).
Perhaps more probative, however, are the inferences to be drawn from the
history of the Convention as a whole. The general pro-enforcement bias
informing the Convention and explaining its supersession of the Geneva
Convention points toward a narrow reading of the public policy defense. An
expensive construction of this defense would vitiate the Convention's basic effort
to remove preexisting obstacles to enforcement. See Straus, Arbitration of
Disputes between Multinational Corporations, in New Strategies for Peaceful
Resolution of International Business Disputes 114-15 (1971); Digest of
Proceedings of International Business Disputes Conference, April 14, 1971, in
id. at 191 (remarks of Professor W. Reese). Additionally, considerations of
reciprocity-considerations given express recognition in the Convention
itself 4-- counsel courts to invoke the public policy defense with caution lest
foreign courts frequently accept it as a defense to enforcement of arbitral
awards rendered in the United States.
We conclude, therefore, that the Convention's public policy defense should
be construed narrowly. Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied
on this basis only where enforcement would violate the forum state's most basic
notions of morality and justice. Cf. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117, comment c, at 340 (1971); Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918).
Under this view of the public policy provision in the Convention, Overseas'
policy defense may easily be dismissed. Overseas argues that various actions by
United States officials subsequent to the severance of American-Egyptian
relations-most particularly, AID's withdrawal of financial support for the
Overseas-RAKTA contract-required Overseas, as a loyal American citizen, to
abandon the project. Enforcement of an award predicated on the feasibility of
Overseas' returning to work in defiance of these expressions of national polIicy
"'A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present Convention against other
Contracting States except to the extent that it is itself bound to apply the Convention."
Article XIV. Cf. Comment, supra, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441 at 486-87:
[11n a system based upon reciprocity any tendency to take an overly narrow view of foreign
arbitral awards will be balanced by a desire to obtain the widest acceptance of America's awards
among the courts of other signatory states, which also have the public policy loophole available
to them.
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would therefore allegedly contravene United States public policy. In equating
"national" policy with United States "public" policy, the appellant quite
plainly misses the mark. To read the public policy defense as a parochial device
protective of national political interests would seriously undermine the
Convention's utility. This provision was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of
international politics under the rubric of "public policy." Rather, a
circumscribed public policy doctrine was contemplated by the Convention's
framers and every indication is that the United States, in acceding to the
Convention, meant to subscribe to this supranational emphasis. Cf. Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., -U.S._ , 42 U.S.L.W. 4911, 4915-16 n. 15 (June 17,
1974).5
To deny enforcement of this award largely because of the United States'
falling out with Egypt in recent years would mean converting a defense intended
to be of narrow scope into a major loophole in the Convention's mechanism for
enforcement. We have little hesitation, therefore, in disallowing Overseas'
proposed public policy defense.
B. Non-Arbitrability
Article V(2)(a) authorizes a court to deny enforcement, on a defendant's or its
own motion, of a foreign arbitral award when "[tihe subject matter of the
difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that [the
forum] country." Under this provision, a court sitting in the United States
might, for example, be expected to decline enforcement of an award involving
arbitration of an antitrust claim in view of domestic arbitration cases which
have held that antitrust matters are entrusted to the exclusive competence of the
judiciary. See, e.g., American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,
391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). On the other hand, it may well be that the special
considerations and policies underlying a "truly international agreement,"
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., supra, 42 U.S.L.W. 4911 at 4914, call for a
narrower view of non-arbitrability in the international than the domestic
context. Compare id. with Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (enforcement of
international, but not domestic, agreement to arbitrate claim based on alleged
Securities Act violations.)
Resolution of Overseas' non-arbitrability argument, however, does not
require us to reach such difficult distinctions between domestic and foreign
awards. For Overseas' argument, that "United States foreign policy issues can
hardly be placed at the mercy of foreign arbitrators 'who are charged with the
execution of no public trust' and whose loyalties are to foreign interests," Brief
for Appellant at 23, plainly fails to raise so substantial an issue of arbitrability.
'Moreover, the facts here fail to demonstrate that considered government policy forbids
,completion of the contract itself by a private party.
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The mere fact that an issue of national interest may incidentally figure into the
resolution ot a breach of contract claim does not make the dispute not
arbitrable. Rather, certain categories of claims may be non-arbitrable because
of the special national interest vested in their resolution. Cf American Safety
Equipment Corp., supra, 391 F.2d 821 at 826-27. Furthermore, even were the
test for non-arbitrability of an ad hoc nature, Overseas' situation would almost
certainly not meet the standard, for Overseas grossly exaggerates the magnitude
of the national interest involved in the resolution of its particular claim. Simply
because acts of the United States are somehow implicated in a case one cannot
conclude that the United States is vitally interested in its outcome. Finally, the
Supreme Court's decision in favor of arbitrability in a case far more prominently
displaying public features than the instant one, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
supra, compels by analogy the conclusion that the foreign award against
Overseas dealt with a subject arbitrable under United States law.
The court below was correct in denying relief to Overseas under the
Convention's non-arbitrability defense to enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. There is no special national interest in judicial, rather than arbitral,
resolution of the breach of contract claim underlying the award in this case.
C. Inadequate Opportunity to Present Defense
Under Article V(1)(b) of the Convention, enforcement of a foreign arbitral
award may be denied if the defendant can prove that he was "not given proper
notice . . . or was otherwise unable to present his case." This provision
essentially sanctions the application of the forum state's standards of due
process. See Quigley, supra, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 at 1067 n. 81; Quigley,
Convention of Foreign ArbitralAwards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 825 (1972); Aksen,
American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius, in NEW
STRATEGIES, supra, at 48.
Overseas seeks relief under this provision for the arbitration court's refusal to
delay proceedings in order to accommodate the speaking schedule of one of
Overseas' witnesses, David Nes, the United States Charge d'Affairs in Egypt at
the time of the Six Day War. This attempt to state a due process claim fails for
several reasons. First, inability to produce one's witnesses before an arbitral
tribunal is a risk inherent in an agreement to submit to arbitration. By agreeing
to submit disputes to arbitration, a party relinquishes his courtroom
rights-including that to subpoena witnesses-in favor of arbitration "with all
of its well known advantages and drawbacks." Washington-Baltimore News-
paper Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). Secondly, the logistical problems of scheduling hearing dates
convenient to parties, counsel and arbitrators scattered about the globe argues
against deviating from an initially mutually agreeable time plan unless a
scheduling change is truly unavoidable. In this instance, Overseas' allegedly key
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witness was kept from attending the hearing due to a prior commitment to
lecture at an American university-hardly the type of obstacle to his presence
which would require the arbitral tribunal to postpone the hearing as a matter of
fundamental fairness to Overseas. Finally, Overseas cannot complain that the
tribunal decided the case without considering evidence critical to its defense and
within only Mr. Nes' ability to produce. In fact, the tribunal did have before it
an affidavit by Mr. Nes in which he furnished, by his own account, "a good deal
of the information to which I would have testified." Appendix to Brief of
Appellant at 184a. Moreover, had Mr. Nes wished to furnish all the information
to which he would have testified, there is every reason to believe that the
arbitration tribunal would have considered that as well.
The arbitration tribunal acted within its discretion in declining to reschedule
a hearing for the convenience of an Overseas witness. Overseas' due process
rights under American law, rights entitled to full force under the Convention as
a defense to enforcement, were in no way infringed by the tribunal's decision.
D. Arbitration in Excess of Jurisdiction
Under Article V(1)(c), one defending against enforcement of an arbitral
award may prevail by proving that:
The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope
of the submission to arbitration....
This provision tracks in more detailed form § 10(d) of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(d), which authorizes vacating an award "[wihere the
arbitrators exceeded their powers." Both provisions basically allow a party to
attack an award predicated upon arbitration of a subject matter not within the
agreement to submit to arbitration. This defense to enforcement of a foreign
award, like the others already discussed, should be construed narrowly. Once
again a narrow construction would comport with the enforcement-facilitating
thrust of the Convention. In addition, the case law under the similar provision
of the Federal Arbitration Act strongly supports a strict reading. See, e.g.,
United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
In making this defense as to three components of the award, Overseas must
therefore overcome a powerful presumption that the arbitral body acted within
its powers. Overseas principally directs its challenge at the $185,000 awarded
for loss of production. Its jurisdictional claim focuses on the provision of the
contract reciting that "[n]either party shall have any liability for loss of
production." The tribunal cannot properly be charged, however, with simply
ignoring this alleged limitation on the subject matter over which its decision-
making powers extended. Rather, the arbitration court interpreted the
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provision not to preclude jurisdiction on this matter. As in United Steelworkers
ofAmerica v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra, the court may be satisfied
that the arbitrators premised the award on a construction of the contract and
that it is "not apparent," 363 U.S. 593 at 598, that the scope of the submission
to arbitration has been exceeded.
The appellant's attack on the $60,000 award for startup expenses and
$30,000 in costs cannot withstand the most cursory scrutiny. In characterizing
the $60,000 as "consequential damages" (and thus proscribed by the
arbitration agreement), Overseas is again attempting to secure a reconstruction
in this court of the contract-an activity wholly inconsistent with the deference
due arbitral decisions on law and fact. See generally, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Company of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 & n. 4 (1956). The $30,000 in
costs is equally unassailable, for the appellant's contention that this portion of
the award is inconsistent with guidelines set by the International Chamber of
Commerce is twice removed from reality. First of all, contrary to Overseas'
representations, these guidelines (contained in the Guide to ICC Arbitration
and reproduced in relevant part in Appendix to Brief of Appellant at 408a) do
not require, as a pre-condition to an award of expenses, express authority for
such an award in the arbitration clause. The arbitration agreement's silence on
this matter, therefore, is not determinative in the case under review. Secondly,
since the parties in fact complied with the Guide's advice to reach agreement on
this matter prior to arbitration-i. e., the request by each for such an award for
expenses amounts to tacit agreement on this point-any claim of fatal deviation
from the Guide is disingenuous to say the least.
Although the Convention recognizes that an award may not be enforced
where predicated on a subject matter outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction, it
does not sanction second-guessing the arbitrator's construction of the parties'
agreement. The appellant's attempt to invoke this defense, however, calls upon
the court to ignore this limitation on its decision-making powers and usurp the
arbitrator's role. The district court took a proper view of its own jurisdiction in
refusing to grant relief on this ground.
E. Award in "Manifest Disregard" of Law
Both the legislative history of Article V, see supra, and the statute enacted to
implement the United States' accession to the Convention" are strong authority
for treating as exclusive the bases set forth in the Convention for vacating an
award. On the other hand, the Federal Arbitration Act, specifically 9 U.S.C.
§ 10, has been read to include an implied defense to enforcement where the
award is in "manifest disregard" of the law. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436
"'... The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement specified in the said Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 207.
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(1953); Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacts International Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d
577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate and
Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960).
This case does not require us to decide, however, whether this defense
stemming from dictum in Wilko, supra, obtains in the international arbitration
context. For even assuming that the "manifest disregard" defense applies under
the Convention, we would have no difficulty rejecting the appellant's contention
that such "manifest disregard" is in evidence here. Overseas in effect asks this
court to read this defense as a license to review the record of arbitral
proceedings for errors of fact or law-a role which we have emphatically
declined to assume in the past and reject once again. "[E]xtensive judicial
review frustrates the basic purpose of arbitration, which is to dispose of disputes
quickly and avoid the expense and delay of extended court proceedings." Saxis
Steamship Co., supra, 375 F.2d 577 at 582. See also, Amicizia Societa
Navegazione, supra, 274 F.2d 805 at 808.
Insofar as this defense to enforcement of awards in "manifest disregard" of
law may be cognizable under the Convention, it, like the other defenses raised
by the appellant, fails to provide a sound basis for vacating the foreign arbitral
award. We therefore affirm the district court's confirmation of the award.
RAKTA does not frame its appeal from the district court's decision
disallowing collection on the letter of credit as contingent upon our reversing the
district court's confirmation of the award. Nevertheless, since RAKTA can fully
satisfy the award out of a supersedeas bond posted by the appellant, we consider
RAKTA's appeal no longer to require resolution and therefore decline to rule on
it. 7
'In view of the general rule requiring strict conformity with the terms of a letter of credit,
however, Venizelos, S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 425 F.2d 461, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1970); Banco
Espanol de Credito v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., 385 F.2d 230, 234 (1st Cir. 1967), cert.
denied.
-EDITOR'S NOTE: Pages 1056-57 of the opinion dealing with a technical correction pertaining to the
amount owed and a supplementary award to penalize a frivolous appeal have been omitted.
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